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COLLOQUIUM




Before the National Institute of Trial Advocacy (NITA) held
its first session in Boulder, Colorado in 1972, there was no na-
tionally recognized, coherent methodology for teaching trial advo-
cacy. Trial advocacy teaching before NITA was often anecdotal.
There was no conceptualization of the form or content of trial
advocacy teaching. NITA changed this; it mastered the art of
conceptualizing and communicating trial advocacy skills. While no
organization that desires to remain on the cutting edge can afford
to be satisfied that it has fully achieved its goals, if the only goal
of NITA and of trial advocacy teaching was to make trial advoca-
cy teachers better technical practitioners, then NITA could be
content in the "90s and Beyond" to engage in only minor tinker-
ing with its product.
But the tradition of NITA and of trial advocacy teaching has
been, and should continue to be, characterized by reexamination
and innovation. It is in this spirit that NITA and the ABA Section
of Litigation sponsored the conference "Teaching Trial Advocacy
in the 90s and Beyond: A Critical Evaluation of Trial Advocacy
Teaching Methodologies and Designs for the Future."' In the
same spirit, seven conference presenters contribute their papers
to this Colloquium.
The reason for holding the conference was to ask where this
process of reexamination and innovation should lead us during
the next decade and beyond. The consensus among the pardci-
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean, and Director, Legal Clinic, Northwestern Uni-
versity.
1 The conference was cosponsored by the Northwestern University School of Law
and was held on October 26-27, 1990, at the Northwestern University School of Law.
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pants at the conference was that trial advocacy curricula should
continue to train law students and lawyers to be effective prac-
titioners. The contributors to this Colloquium reflect that consen-
sus. The contributors go farther, however, and argue that trial
advocacy teachers, in addition to providing effective skills training,
should teach students to be critical of accepted wisdom concern-
ing the efficacy and desirability of various trial advocacy tech-
niques. Trial advocacy teaching in the 90s and beyond should
provide students with perspectives from which they can evaluate
the efficacy and values of the litigation and trial process.
The contributors bring this critical approach to their work in
this Colloquium as they analyze the status quo and the future of
trial advocacy teaching. Ronald Allen examines the trial advocacy
teaching from the perspective of the University's teaching and
scholarly mission. Steven Lubet defines the place of thoughtful
and comprehensive trial advocacy teaching within the University.
Edward Imwinkelried describes the need for the integration of
trial advocacy and traditional teaching methodologies. Jonathan
Hyman tells us how he uses trial advocacy teaching techniques in
his contracts class. Stephan Landsman argues that the underlying
values of our adversary system can most effectively be taught
through the use of history. Michael Saks demonstrates that psy-
chology could add an important research agenda to trial advocacy
teaching and scholarship. Abraham Ordover gives us an example
of a trial advocacy curriculum that places emphasis on factual
analysis and the development of case theory.
In this Foreword to the Colloquium, I will briefly describe
the genesis and the nature of modern trial advocacy teaching. I
will then discuss the dominant criticisms of prevailing trial advoca-
cy teaching methodology, followed by some observations concern-
ing the place of trial advocacy teaching in law schools and within
the profession. Finally, I will identify the themes developed in this
Colloquium for future trial advocacy training and scholarship.
II. THE NITA MODEL
The title and theme of this Colloquium, "Teaching Trial Ad-
vocacy in the 90s and Beyond," implies a critique of existing trial
advocacy teaching methodology as well as prescriptions for
change. Because NITA teaching methodology is dominant in law
school and CLE trial advocacy courses, the Colloquium's focus is
on constructive criticism of the "NITA model." By "NITA model,"
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I mean that form of instruction in trial skills which relies upon
student2 performance in simulated trial situations (direct and
cross-examination, opening statements, and closing argument).
The student performance is then critiqued by trial advocacy teach-
ers and/or by experienced trial lawyers.
During the last twenty years, NITA has played the central
role in developing state-of-the-art teaching methodologies for stu-
dents of trial advocacy. Perhaps the most important contribution
that NITA has made in this respect is to introduce methodologies
for case analysis and for the different aspects of trial preparation.
When one analyzes the traditional NITA critique of student per-
formances it is clear that the critique rests on the need for thor-
ough and systematic preparation.' Because of NITA, most trial
lawyers no longer believe that successful trial lawyers are "born
not made." NITA training gives its students tools which can be
utilized for an advertant process of self-improvement.
The contributors to this Colloquium focus on the NITA mod-
el, and equate it with the teaching of trial advocacy generally,
because it is utilized in almost every law school and CLE trial
advocacy course throughout the country.4 In some of these cours-
es, only simulation and critique occur. In other courses, the basic
NITA methodology is supplemented by other forms of instruc-
tion, and the substance of the course goes beyond the teaching of
trial skills and includes instruction in evidence, ethics and the
lawyer's role in the adversary system. The latter phenomenon
occurs primarily in law school courses.5 But whatever is added to
the basic NITA model, students, both in law school and in CLE
courses, consider the "doing" and "critique" portions of trial advo-
2 When I use the word "student," I mean participants in law school and CLE
NITA-style trial advocacy cources.
3 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR PROB-
LEMs AND CAsES rN TRIAL ADVOCACY (5th ed. 1988).
4 Since 1972, 16,464 lawyers have participated in NITA-conducted CLE trial advoca-
cy courses. An additional 6,649 lawyers have participated in NITA-run in-house programs
in law firms and government agencies. NITA materials are used in 150 of the 157 AALS
accredited law schools. NITA sponsors 35 CLE courses per year throughout the country
which enroll approximately 3,000 students per year. Telephone interview with John R.
Kouris, Chief Operating Officer, NITA (Jan. 1991). There is general recognition in the
scholary writing concerning trial advocacy teaching that the status quo is NITA. See, e.g.,
Imwinkelried, The Educational Philosophy of The Trial Practice Course: Reweaving the Seamless
Web, 23 GA. L REV. 668 (1989); Lubet, What We Should Teach (But Don't) When We
Teach Trial Advocacy, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 123 (1987).
5 See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 4, and Lubet, supra note 4, for descriptions of
how some law school trial advocacy courses go beyond training in technical skills.
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cacy courses the most demanding and the most valuable portions
of their learning experience.
III. EMERGING CRITICISMS OF THE NITA MODEL:
THE NEED FOR REASSESSMENT
The NITA method has made trial lawyers think more system-
atically about preparation and performance. Teachers of trial ad-
vocacy have not done as much, however, to assess the impact of
what they teach on the litigation process; nor have most trial
advocacy teachers gone beyond generally perceived notions of
what is, and what is not, effective advocacy. These perceived no-
tions are typically intuitive judgments, which are generally accept-
ed by the practicing trial bar. They include accepted wisdom
about how the material of trial should be organized to maximize
persuasiveness, and about how students' personal characteristics
can be modified to improve communication with the finder of
fact. The articles in this Colloquium suggest that it is now time to
test these perceived notions, both with respect to the implicit
messages they send about the priorities and objectives of trial
advocacy teaching and with regard to the limits these messages
impose upon teaching and research.
There are a number of reasons why we should reassess our
current methods of teaching and thinking about trial advocacy.
First, it has been almost twenty years since the last major reassess-
ment of trial advocacy teaching methodology-since the birth of
NITA. The mere passage of time makes it prudent to take a clos-
er look at how we are teaching trial advocacy. A second reason
for reassessing the NITA method is that the significant criticisms
of the NITA method have yet to receive a formal response.
Professor Kenney Hegland's 1982 "critique"6 of what he per-
ceived to be the dangers inherent in the dominant NITA teaching
methodology sparked the debate about NITA teaching methodolo-
gy. Hegland identified two defects of the NITA Model: The first
was that the NITA method by itself
tends to communicate, first, that lawyers have no obligation to
the truth; second, that law practice is simply a game, that its
only meaning can come from playing the game well-from the
effective use of technique; and third, that the only goal of the
6 Hegland, Moral Dilemmas In Teaching Trial Advocacy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 69
(1982).
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client is to win, even if winning means abusing one's oppo-
nents.
7
Hegland's second criticism focused on the role of trial advocacy
teaching in the law school curriculum:
The teaching of technique can never be the law school's only
goal. Law schools are above all academic institutions, and the
academy has two responsibilities: to teach the practices of the
real world and to submit those practices to vigorous challenge
and examination. The academy must provide more than experi-
ence and insight: it must nourish conscience. The law-school
curriculum typically has maintained this tradition. The academ-
ic program is not designed as a bar cram course. Instructors
do not just teach cases-they subject them to sharp analysis and
critique. Is the opinion logically coherent? Upon what premise
or world view does it rest? How will the rule affect society or
those who use it? Is the rule just?8
The articles in this Colloquium suggest that the next steps for
NITA, and for trial advocacy teachers generally, would be to uti-
lize accumulated wisdom to accomplish two goals: 1) develop
more comprehensive educational programs for law students and
for lawyers;9 and 2) acknowledge and synthesize the social science
research regarding the litigation process and jury decisionmaking
in order to evaluate the efficacy of its teaching methodology.'
0
7 I& at 72.
8 1o. at 71-72. A similar exhortation concerning the nature and content of "skills"
courses has been voiced by Professor Roger Cramton:
The addition of courses focusing on lawyering skills will broaden and deepen
the law curriculum only if those courses are infused with a theoretical and criti-
cal perspective. If they merely reinforce the existing vocational orientation of
the traditional skills courses-those focusing on the analysis and manipulation of
cases and doctrine-they will have failed. Courses in interviewing, negotiation,
counseling, and advocacy will acquire a permanent place in the basic curriculum
of the university law school because they are founded on insightful, theoretical
explanations of why lawyers and officials behave as they do and because they
produce important empirical findings that illuminate how lawyers, clients, and
officials behave and interact or lead to valuable normative statements of how
they should behave.
Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC., 321, 331-32 (1982).
9 See generally Lubet, supra note 4. There is no reason why Professor Lubet's high-
er aspirations for trial advocacy teaching in law schools should not motivate the teaching
of continuing education courses. As a matter of fact, CLE audiences often tend to be
more inclined than law students to be interested in the kind of broader knowledge that
Professor Lubet describes.
10 See, e.g., Kassin, Williams & Saunders, Dirty Tricks of Cross-Examination: The Influ-
ence of Conjectural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 373 (1990), in which the
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The articles in this Colloquium suggest ways in which the tradi-
tional NITA methodology might be modified and augmented in
order that it do more than teach trial skills in a vacuum.
IV. IMPLEMENTING PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: THE NEED TO
UNITE THE CONSTITUENCIES OF TRIAL ADVOCACY TEACHING
When making the assessment of current models of teaching
trial advocacy, the articles in this Colloquium must address three
audiences: law students; law professors; and practioners-the law-
yers and judges who learn and teach in CLE courses." These
audiences are no different from any of the constituencies of other
legal academic disciplines. Yet the teaching of trial advocacy and
other skills courses has, over the last twenty years, been the sub-
ject of intense scrutiny from each of these constituencies. Each
segment of the audience has different interests, status and de-
mands. Teachers of lawyering skills have spent considerable time
explaining and justifying their pedagogy to each segment, and the
content of trial advocacy curricula is the result of the input of
each of these groups.
Beginning in the late 1960s, students (and some professors)
demanded more relevant courses. Included in the category of
relevant courses were those that exposed students to what actually
occurred in lawyer-client relationships and in courtrooms. The
pressure from students, professors, and organizations such as the
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility
authors examine the impact of improper cross-examination questions on the credibility of
witnesses. See also Is the Juiy Competent, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn, 1989, at
1-353, for a collection of recent works by social scientists regarding jury decision-making.
Professor Michael Saks suggests that it may be possible, utilizing psychological research,
to make an informed decision about whether to wait for the opponent to bring out the
damaging facts on cross-examination or to "front" the prejudicial information by eliciting
it on direct-examination. See Saks, Turning Practice Into Progress: Better Lawyering Through
Experimentation, 66 NOTRE DAME L REV. 801, 807 & n.28 (1991). Recent articles on the
role and behavior of juries include Frankel, A Trial Judge's Penpective on Providing Tools
for Rational Juy Decisionmaking, 85 Nw. U.L REV. 221 (1990); Friedland, The Competency
and Responsibility of Juries in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 190 (1990); Heuer &
Penrod, Some Suggestions for the Critical Appraisal of a More Active Jury, 85 Nw U.L REv.
226 (1990); and The Role of Juiy in Civil Dispute Resolution, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1-600.
11 I leave out perhaps the most important group affected by the ways in which we
teach trial advocacy-the justice-consuming public. Although the consuming public should
have an influence in the ways in which our system of legal education trains litigators
and .trial lawyers, I am not aware of any significant input that the consuming public has
had on the process. Perhaps this will change as professional barriers to public involve-
ment in the regulation of the legal profession break down. An example of this is the
trend toward involvement of non-lawyers in the lawyer disciplinary process.
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(CLEPR), compelled law faculties to teach students skills such as
interviewing, counseling, negotiation, and trial advocacy.
For the most part, academia was critical of this rush to rele-
vance, although it could not deny that students and the legal
profession would benefit from curricula which improved lawyer
skills. The debate between legal academia and those who advocat-
ed skills training focused on when and where such training
should take place, who should be responsible for it, and what the
status of the skills teachers should be within law school faculties.
Law schools resisted giving "skills training" curricula and its teach-
ers status equal to "traditional" curricula and faculty.
One can debate the issue of whether the criticisms of "skills
training" from legal academia were motivated by resistance to
change or by true principle. It is very likely that both were moti-
vating factors. But it cannot be doubted that the skepticism of
academia regarding the worthiness of trial advocacy courses has
had a great deal to do with the ways in which trial advocacy cur-
ricula have developed. Many law faculties have been unwilling
fully to incorporate advocacy curricula and personnel into their
institutions; even now, advocacy personnel and curricula are often
merely tolerated. Too often, trial advocacy teachers have been
denied the financial and institutional resources to develop innova-
tive teaching or scholarly agendas.
The third constituency concerned about the teaching of trial
advocacy is composed of the lawyers and judges who try cases.
Before NITA, this constituency could not find a congenial home
in law school faculties or curricula. As a result, they built an insti-
tution of their own-NITA-which developed its own teaching
methodology, teaching materials, and faculty. The lawyers, judges,
and law teachers who attended early NITA programs saw that
NITA was doing a far better job of educating trial lawyers than
law schools. Law teachers carried this message from the early
NITA summer sessions in Boulder, Colorado, back to their law
schools. As a result, NITA-style trial advocacy courses were incor-
porated into law, school curricula; but, for the most part, trial
advocacy courses were, and they continue to be, taught by adjunct
faculty.
What is the significance of the fact that our current methods
of teaching trial advocacy are the result of the coalescence of
these disparate forces and interests? There have been both posi-
tive and negative effects. On the positive side, the development of
trial advocacy teaching methodology outside of traditional legal
1991]
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academia by practitioners and lawyers who had experience in the
litigation and trial process ensured that trial advocacy curricula
would be relevant. Moreover, practitioners conveyed their enthusi-
asm about the litigation process and trial work to students in a
way that convinced their students that litigation and trial work
was exciting and worthwhile. It is unlikely that the law school
setting could have engendered this kind of enthusiasm, energy,
creativity, and productivity.
The negative impact of the law schools being for the most
part isolated from the development of trial advocacy teaching
methodology has been that law schools have continued to ignore
the subject as a serious academic discipline and seem content not
to provide leadership in thinking about ways in which trial advo-
cacy should be taught or in creating research agenda. Despite the
fact that Hegland and Cramton penned their observations and
criticisms in 1982, the law schools and NITA have so far failed to
take the next step which they advocated-systematic and careful
planning of trial advocacy curricula and the encouragement of
critical thinking about the litigation and trial process. This next
step could well take place through the cooperation of law schools
and NITA. NITA has developed state-of-the-art teaching methodol-
ogies. Law schools have faculty who are able to examine and to
test those methodologies, as well as to test and examine the un-
derlying purposes and premises of trial advocacy teaching and its
place within the law school and in continuing legal education.
V. THIS COLLOQUIUM'S WORK AND THE FuTuRE OF TRIAL
ADVOCACY TEACHING
The papers presented in this Colloquium are examples of the
kind of work that needs to be done to harness the energies with-
in NITA and within the law schools to produce a more purpose-
ful and comprehensive approach to the teaching of trial advocacy.
The most fundamental issue that must be addressed as we move
toward a comprehensive trial advocacy curriculum is the place of
trial advocacy courses within the University. The articles by Profes-
sors Allen and Lubet exemplify the kind of constructive debate
that is needed concerning the nature of trial advocacy teaching,
and its place within law schools. This debate is important because
it focuses on the need to define the objectives of trial advocacy
teaching and of trial advocacy scholarship. Professor Allen asks
where trial advocacy teaching fits within the concept of the mod-
ern university. In asking this question, he identifies a tension be-
[Vol. 66:687
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tween "traditional" trial advocacy teaching and the aspirations of
the modem university. He identifies the "[a]spirations of the
[u]niversity" as service, research, and teaching." He suggests that
the teachers of trial advocacy must develop theories to underscore
and explain trial advocacy teaching in relation to those aspira-
tions.1
In order to make this inquiry concrete, Allen focuses on the
now proverbial Irving Younger lesson regarding cross-examination.
The anecdote involves how a witness knew that the defendant had
bitten off the plaintiff's nose. The intended lesson of this scenar-
io, according to Allen, is that a trial lawyer should never ask a ques-
tion to which she does not know the answer. 4 If the cross-exam-
iner does stray beyond the confines of the rule, so says Younger,
the witness' damaging response will be, "I saw him spit it out."
Allen criticizes the message implicit in this oft-cited trial advocacy
lesson on two levels. The first criticism concerns the message that
it sends regarding acceptable, even aspirational, lawyer behavior.
That message, according to Allen, is that "the advice is to engage
in a process that on its face may detract from truth seeking."
5
In the larger context, Allen contends that the "I saw him spit it
out" example confirms the fact that "traditional" trial advocacy
training "purports to be premised on serving the needs of the
adversary system's search for truth, but it appears to be premised
on the needs of serving the client." 6 Allen sees a contradiction
between the university's obligation to foster honest inquiry, and
the prevailing use of the Younger example. If NITA is to find its
place in the university, according to Allen, it must strive to find a
theory which criticizes or explains the oft-referred to Younger
example. "Programs belong in the universities only if they ema-
nate from a conceptual plane, even if a controversial one, and
only if theories justifying the program can be articulated, tested,
and justified.""
Professor Lubet's article, and his work in constructing a trial
advocacy curriculum described in that article, reflect both a posi-
tive theory for the teaching of trial advocacy and a response to
12 Allen, NITA and the University, 66 NoTRE DAME L REv. 705, 711 (1991).
13 Id. at 712-13.
14 See id. at 713.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 714.
17 Id. at 717.
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the issues raised by Professor Allen and other critics of "tradition-
al" trial advocacy teaching. By "response" I mean that Professor
Lubet and other thoughtful teachers of trial advocacy have been
developing their own "positive" programs to ensure the richness
and ethical intent of trial advocacy training. They have also been
working to develop the kind of conceptual underpinnings which
Professor Allen demands. The need for the development of a
model for the teaching of trial advocacy is underscored by Profes-
sor Lubet: "Our challenge is to build upon the simula-
tion/critique method to develop a university model of advocacy
education.""8 Professor Lubet's model for trial advocacy teaching
and scholarship, however, may have more modest goals than
those deemed necessary by Professor Allen.
Allen would require trial advocacy curricula to justify them-
selves as a university taught discipline only through their search
for "global conceptualizations and theories that organize the fields
and give guidance to research."19 Lubet argues that "there are
other, more modest, goals that nonetheless place the trial advoca-
cy course squarely within the tradition of university-based profes-
sional schools."2" Lubet categorizes the information transmitted
in his trial advocacy course as "structural knowledge" and defines
it as "the understanding of the basic constructs of the profession,
the manner or means in which the profession functions, or the
language and grammar of the professional discourse." 21 Professor
Lubet's example of the use of a particularly hard-hitting, and per-
haps unethical, cross-examination of a robbery and attempted
rape victim to evoke class discussion concerning the limits of
cross-examination 22 thus goes beyond mere "skills training" in its
positing of ethical dilemmas; however, it does not necessarily
include discussion of the more global inquiries that Allen argues
are a prerequisite for inclusion in the mission of the university.
Lubet's discussion is designed to "explore the relationship be-
tween the formal rules of ethics and the advocate's choice of
theory."23 Such discussions, and the trial advocacy course that
Professor Lubet has designed, belong in the university because
18 Lubet, Advocacy Education: The Case for Structural Knowledge, 66 NOTRE DAME L
REv. 721, 724 (1991).
19 Allen, supra note 12, at 712.
20 Lubet, supra note 18, at 726.
21 Id at 727.
22 It at 728.
23 It at 729.
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they give to students "the structural knowledge that they will need
in order to effectuate the visions instilled in the balance of their
professional training."24
Lubet goes on from his response to Allen's criticism of trial
advocacy teaching methodology to describe an ideal law school
model for advocacy training. This model focuses attention on
analysis of facts through the use of rich factual scenarios and
problems which require students, through problem solving, to
reassess their first and most obvious solutions. Interestingly, and
perhaps somewhat controversially, Lubet argues that "presenta-
tion" as an end should be deemphasized: "Students will be more
successful not because they can speak well or argue more persua-
sively, but rather because they can structure facts and law into a com-
pelling and theoretically sound case."25
Finally, Lubet turns to the Younger example-the model "les-
son" of trial advocacy teaching which so disturbed Professor Al-
len. Lubet shows that the Younger lesson can be interpreted in
many different ways to teach important lessons about trial advoca-
cy. The point is that the Younger lesson can be, and in Lubet's
course it is, used to promote student understanding of the adver-
sary process--"structural knowledge." According to Lubet, if one
assumes that the witness is not, or may not be telling "the truth,
the decision not to ask the "how do you know" question on cross-
examination may stem from a desire to promote, rather than to
conceal the truth.
Allen and Lubet debate the issue of whether, and under what
circumstances, trial advocacy training belongs in the law school
curriculum. Professor Edward Imwinkelried argues, and the evi-
dence he cites demonstrates, that law schools have generally ac-
cepted, or at least tolerated, the teaching of trial advocacy. The
challenge of the future, Imwinkelried argues, is to fashion a true
partnership between those who teach substantive law courses and
those who teach trial advocacy. 21 This partnership must be fash-
ioned to ensure that trial advocacy curricula remain viable in the
face of changing and competing demands for scarce law school
resources and because the cooperation of substantive law and trial
advocacy teachers. in formulating curricula will enrich both the
24 Id. at 733.
25 Id. at 734.
26 See Imwinkeldied, On Achieving Synew in the Law School Curriculum, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 739, 740-41 (1991).
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substantive and the trial advocacy curricula. Imwinkelried would
impose the duty to form the necessary alliances equally upon the
substantive and the trial advocacy teachers. The substantive law
teacher should ensure that "the students completing substantive
law courses receive rigorous training in analyzing the legal signifi-
cance of facts,"2" and the trial advocacy teacher should do more
than merely "content [herself] with the identification of the best
strategies and tactics for litigating cases within the existing sys-
tem."2" The trial advocacy teacher must teach critical analysis of
the trial process if the discipline is to grow and to prosper.
The kind of "cooperation" between trial advocacy teachers
and substantive law teachers advocated by Professor Imwinkelried
is found in the persona and the teaching methodology of Profes-
sor Jonathan Hyman. Professor Hyman, a clinician and a teacher
of contracts, utilizes NITA teaching methodology in his contracts
course at Rutgers. In Professor Hyman's contracts course, stu-
dents participate in the arbitration of a contracts claim as advo-
cates and as arbitrators. Professor Hyman includes this exercise,
and others like it, in his class in order to
keep[] the students firmly grounded in thinking about what it
takes to elicit a decision in favor of their client. The doctrinal
rules play a part, but not for the purpose of developing a
comon understanding of the single best rule for choosing be-
tween the cost of completion and the diminution of value.29
While the exercises that Professor Hyman utilizes do not in-
volve every aspect of NITA or trial advocacy methodology, the
use of the exercises helps students "enhance their ability to com-
municate persuasively . .. [and] learn to act ethically while carry-
ing out lawyers' tasks.""0 Hyman notes that "[m]aking use of the
particular, not only the general, is the key concept that runs through-
out NITA's various techniques."3 Use of these simulations also
forces students to think about the tension between discovery and
invention:
When an accomplished litigator articulates an effective theory
of the case, conducts the direct examinations with telling de-
27 Id. at 752.
28 Id. at 749.
29 Hyman, Discovery and Invention: The NITA Method in the Contracts Classroom, 66
NoTRE DAME L REv. 759, 767 (1991).
30 Id. at 771.
31 Id. at 772-73.
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tail, and maneuvers the opposing witnesses into providing dis-
crete and helpful facts, has she invented the case by the artful-
ness of her work, or has she merely discovered what was there
in the facts all along?32
Hyman notes that this question "gets to the heart of what
occurs in law school classes and in NITA courses ... [and] ex-
plains why the two can seem so different.""3 Use of the NITA
method or simulation promotes the "invention" element of legal
education: "The highest art taught by the NITA method is the
skill of inventing discoveries. " '
The articles by Allen, Lubet, Imwinkelried, and Hyman sug-
gest different ways in which trial advocacy teaching methodology
can deepen our students' understanding of the adversary process.
Allen's approach to stimulating us to think about how we teach
trial advocacy is to assert that existing methodologies neglect seri-
ous intellectual inquiry into the nature of the adversary process.
Lubet suggests that, at least in the course that he has designed,
students devote substantial intellectual energy to understanding
the premises and the workings of our adversary system, and that
extensive work on the "critique" of the system, while laudable,
need not take place in his course. Imwinkelried argues for an
integration of substantive and process courses in order to give
students appreciation for both the theoretical and for the mar-
shalling of facts which support legal theories. Hyman demon-
strates how this integration of teaching methodology actually
works, and how the use of simulation promotes deeper under-
standing of legal doctrine, as well as facility in using doctrine and
facts to develop theory.
Thus, in these four articles, we move from debate about the
place of trial advocacy training within the university to arguments
and examples which support the proposition that not only is the
teaching of trial advocacy valuable in itself, it can and should be
used to strengthen the comprehension and competence of stu-
dents in substantive law courses. If utilized in the ways that Allen,
Lubet, Imwinkelried, and Hyman suggest, trial advocacy teaching
methodology forces students to think abo.ut more than doctrine;
if properly utilized, trial advocacy teaching technique gives stu-
dents a real feel for what it means to be a lawyer.
32 Id. at 773.
33 Id at 774.
34 Id. at 775.
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The focus of the Colloquium has been to criticize and to
justify existing trial advocacy teaching methodology. The purpose
of the endeavor is to attempt to reach a better understanding of
the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary trial advocacy
teaching technique. If adjustments have been required, those ad-
justments have been articulated as being internal to the trial advo-.
cacy teaching process. Thus Professor Lubet describes a course
which responds to the call for more rigor and analysis by
deemphasizing taped performances and by enriching his course
with difficult ethical and strategic choices through the careful
construction of factual scenarios.
These "internal" improvements may not be enough to create
in students a real appreciation for the place of our adversary sys-
tem in our society. Students may gain a good deal of Professor
Lubet's "structural knowledge" regarding the litigation process,
and they may have a better understanding of the relationship
between doctrine and persuasive fact marshalling as the result of
taking Professor Imwinkelried's and Professor Hyman's substantive
law courses, but they still may emerge from law school as "com-
pliant participants in injurious activities,"35 or as nihilists viewing
"everything from a technical perspective."6 Professor Stephan
Landsman asserts that existing trial advocacy curricula and live
client clinics have made little headway in curbing these undesir-
able effects of traditional legal education. Landsman's solution to
the shortcomings of traditional and clinical education is to pres-
ent students with real case stories or narratives. These stories or
narratives, Landsman argues, are effective in presenting students
with the fact that law can do evil and that all lawyers need to be
prepared to question authority. Such cases should "embody a
conflict between a personal sense of justice or decency and a set
of discordant social demands."37 A study of the trial of Sacco
and Vanzetti, for example, "may help young lawyers to focus on
the conflict between what society seems to demand and the dic-
tates of conscience."" Students who take Professor Landsman's
course develop an understanding of "how fragile the system really
35 Landsman, Satanic Cases: A Means of Confronting the Law's Inmorality, 66 NOTRE
DAME L REv. 785, 787 (1991).
36 Id. at 787 (citing Cramton, The Ordinaty Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 247, 257-58 (1978)).
37 Id. at 792.
38 Id. at 794.
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History can tell us how our justice system has performed in
the past. Psychology may be able to assist us in understanding
how the system works now. In his article, Turning Practice into
Progress: Better Lawyering Through Experimentation, Professor Mi-
chael Saks proposes a plan for "marrying the art of trial advocacy
with a methodology for systematically testing ideas about advo-
cacy."40 The reason for proposing such a plan is that "tradition-
al" NITA style critiques of lawyer performance are based on per-
ceived wisdom that is not tested. Professor Saks notes that some
empirical studies of the trial process have been done, particularly
in the area of jury behavior, but he notes very aptly that these
studies have been done
more often in the service of the development of legal policy or
basic learning, rather than trial tactics. Thus, we have two lines
of effort that have not yet crossed: the trial practitioner's unde-
veloped taste for testing and the social scientist's research that
has rarely been aimed at answering questions of tactics or strat-
egy.41
Professor Saks suggests that trial advocacy teachers and NITA test
the efficacy of their precepts in the classroom through the use of
controlled experiments in which students would be directed to
use, or not to use, certain techniques. The effect, of the use or
nonuse of these techniques would then be assessed utilizing mock
juries. Although the idea of utilizing trial advocacy and NITA
courses to gain more concrete knowledge of what is, and what is
not, effective certainly has appeal, Saks warns that "[t]he growth
of powerful knowledge is likely to confer a systematic advantage
to some clients and some interests over others, and contribute to
more exaggerated inequalities in legal services than already ex-
ist."42 Professor Saks concludes that this danger could be dimin-
ished if an organization like NITA took the lead in disseminating
such information.
One problem that Professor Saks does not explore is just
how the research and teaching agendas of law school trial advoca-
cy courses and CLE programs could be successfully integrated. In
constructing any experiments along the lines suggested by Profes-
39 Id. at 798.
40 Saks, supra note 10, at 801.
41 Id. at 806 (footnote omitted).
42 Id. at 811.
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sor Saks, it will be important to integrate the teaching and the
research agendas, in order to ensure that the course meets
students' educational needs. But the problems inherent in such a
marriage of research and teaching should not preclude experi-
mentation like the kind proposed by Professor Saks. In a law
school course for example, students might well learn more about
the efficacy of certain practices from the reactions of jurors than
from the anecdotal observations and criticisms of faculty. In CLE
NITA courses, the same might be true, and some time might be
devoted to testing NITA pedagogy utilizing mock juries who
would hear portions of direct examination rather than confining
their use to the full trial segments of such courses. The participa-
tion of research psychologists in the design of law school and
CLE courses might well produce significant findings.
The theme that appreciation of the existence and the genesis
of facts is crucial to lawyering is developed by Professor Abraham
Ordover. Professor Ordover notes that various studies of the legal
profession demonstrate that fact gathering and analysis were the
most important skills for the practicing lawyer to possess.43
Professor Ordover, in his blueprint for the 90s and beyond,
suggests a course be given during the first weeks of law school
that would focus on fact development and fact analysis. He also
describes a course called pretrial litigation in which there are no
canned facts, just a client, an opposing party, two lawyers, and
witnesses. In this context students experience both the discovery
and invention aspects of lawyering referred to by Professor
Hyman. Professor Ordover suggests that this teaching methodolo-
gy be employed in substantive law courses, particularly during the
third year when students are inclined to give relatively little at-
tention to their traditional law school courses.
VI. CONCLUSION
Those of us who have been students and teachers in NITA-
style trial advocacy courses remember one of the first admonitions
given to incoming students: the process of learning by doing and
critique places students in a threatening position. NITA teachers
exhort students to be open to constructive criticism. In this Collo-
quium, NITA teaching methodology is the student, and the pre-
43 See Ordover, Teaching Sensitivity To Fats, 66 NOTRE DAME L REV. 813, 814-15
(1991) (discussing F. ZEMANs & V. ROSENBLuM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION
(1981)).
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senters are the teachers. The articles contained in this Colloquium
suggest some new directions for trial advocacy teaching. We offer
these suggestions in the spirit of constructive critique. For the
most part these critiques recommend supplementation, and not
an overhaul of the NITA method. We hope this Colloquium, and
the further reflections of lawyers and scholars that undoubtedly
will follow, will stimulate the kind of energy and innovation that
has characterized NITA and the teaching of trial advocacy during
the last twenty years.

